

**A round-robin study from 12 UK fire services
on the fire safety design of open-sided car parks**

Structure in Fire Forum

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Environmental Engineering



Research Background



Introducing car parks as specific type of “storage buildings”

1967 BRE UK


1. Series of experiments on fire risk of **open-sided** car park
2. **Minimum fire resistance: 30 minutes**
3. **Negligible possibility** of fire spread between cars
4. **Fire growth** depends on **calorific value** of vehicles



Formed the foundation of Approved Document B

1966-1970 BRE Statical Review


1. Observed fire incidents in multi-storey car parks over 4 years
2. **Confirmed low fire spread risk**
3. **No reported major fire spread cases**
4. **No structural damage**



Research Background



1994 ● VTT Fire tests Finland

1. 3 fire tests on 1990s medium passenger car targeting calorific value measurement
2. **Max HRR: 1.8 MW per vehicle**



1995 ● FRS study UK

1. Fire tests on 1980s and 1970s vehicles
2. **Max HRR: 8.5 MW PHRR** increase from 1970s models to 1980s
3. **Ventilation** significantly affects **fire behavior**



Research Background


2002 CTICM statistical report

1. Analyzed fire data from 1995-1997
2. 98.7% of fire cases involved less than 3 burning cars
3. 10 fire tests for both single vehicle and multiple vehicles fire scenarios
4. 1990s vehicles HRR: Max of 8.3MW
5. 1980s vehicles HRR: Max of 2.1 MW
6. 12 minutes for fire spread between cars
7. **No structural collapse**
8. **No additional fire protection required**

2010 BRE Report (BD2552)-UK

1. Fire spread in enclosed car parks
2. Less severity in open-sided car parks due to better ventilation
3. **No additional fire spread control required in open-sided car parks**
4. **Minimum fire resistance requirements: 15 minutes**

2019 **Current ADB Version**



Liverpool 2017: Kings Dock Car Park Fire

What are the lessons learnt?

1. Lack of suppression system



**B3: Internal Fire spread
(Structure)**

Fire Safety Concern:
Is automatic suppression
system required?

2. Drainage system design



**B2: Internal Fire spread
(Linings)**

Fire Safety Concern:
Is 30 minutes means of escape
fire protection adequate?

3. Fuel tank disruption: Fuel running



**B3: Internal Fire spread
(Structure)**

Fire Safety Concern:
Is 15 minutes structural
fire protection adequate?

2019 ● **Current ADB Version**

Table A2 Minimum periods of fire resistance

Purpose group of building	Minimum periods of fire resistance (minutes) in a:					
	Basement storey ^(§) including floor over		Ground or upper storey			
	Depth (m) of a lowest basement		Height (m) of top floor above ground, in a building or separated part of a building			
	More than 10	Not more than 10	Not more than 5	Not more than 18	Not more than 30	More than 30
5. Industrial:						
– not sprinklered	120	90	60	90	120	Not permitted
– sprinklered ⁽²⁾	90	60	30*	60	90	120#
6. Storage and other non-residential:						
a. any building or part not described elsewhere:						
– not sprinklered	120	90	60	90	120	Not permitted
– sprinklered ⁽²⁾	90	60	30*	60	90	120#
b. car park for light vehicles:						
i. open sided car park ⁽³⁾	Not applicable	Not applicable	15*+	15*+ ⁽⁴⁾	15*+ ⁽⁴⁾	60
ii. any other car park	90	60	30*	60	90	120#

Car parks

HM Government

The Building Regulations 2010

Fire safety

B



APPROVED DOCUMENT

Volume 2: Buildings other than dwellings

Requirement B1: Means of warning and escape
Requirement B2: Internal fire spread (linings)
Requirement B3: Internal fire spread (structure)
Requirement B4: External fire spread
Requirement B5: Access and facilities for the fire service
Regulations: 6(3), 7(2) and 38

2019 edition incorporating 2020 and 2022
amendments – for use in England

London 2023: Luton Airport Car Park Fire



1. Lack of suppression system



Is automatic suppression system required? (B3)

2. Low flow rate of water supply



Is water supply system satisfactory? (B5)

3. Partial Structural Collapse





Is 15 minutes structural fire protection adequate? (B2)


Research Method

Detailed Fire Safety Strategy Gloucestershire Airport Overflow Car Park Cheltenham designed by **Ashton Fire Ltd.**

- 1 Fully compliant with Approved Document B (ADB) (volume 2)
- 2 Standalone multi-story car park with steel-concrete structure
- 3 8 stories (ground + 7)
- 4 192 vehicles capacity
- 5 17.5 m tall from the ground floor to the top floor
- 7 All Internal material of Class 1
- 8 No automatic suppression/detection system




Detailed Fire Safety Strategy Gloucestershire Airport Overflow Car Park Cheltenham



**Ground
floor**

**Individuals with
disabilities
+
Plant room**




**First
floor**

**EV bays and
EVCPs**


**Two to sixth
floors**

Normal ICVEs



**Seventh
floor**


Normal ICVEs



Detailed Fire Safety Strategy

B1-Means of Warning and Escape

Horizontal Means of Escape



Vertical Means of Escape

- 1.30 minutes fire resistance of internal escape routes
2. Assisted evacuation of disabled people
3. Two protected staircases at opposing corners
4. Passenger lift

Estimated Occupancy

Floor	Area	Estimated occupancy (persons)	Number of exits	Minimum exit width (mm)
Ground floor	Plant room	0	2	850
	Car park	32	2	850
1st floor	Car park	36	2	850
2nd to 6th floors	Car park	56	2	850
7th floor	Car park	36	2	850

Floor	Use	Floor area (m ²) / no. of parking spaces	Floor space factor	Occupancy (persons)
Ground floor	Accessible parking	12 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	24
	Normal parking	4 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	8
	Plant room	n/a	n/a	0
First floor	EV parking	18 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	36
Second floor	Normal parking	28 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	56
Third floor	Normal parking	28 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	56
Fourth floor	Normal parking	28 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	56
Fifth floor	Normal parking	28 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	56
Sixth floor	Normal parking	28 parking bays	2 persons/parking bay	56
Seventh floor	Normal parking	18 parking bays	2 people/parking bay	36
Total occupancy:				384

Detailed Fire Safety Strategy

B2-Internal Fire Spread-Linings


Internal walls and ceiling linings
→ Class A1 materials

B3-Internal Fire Spread-Structure

1. Building height of 17.5 m → **15 minutes structural fire resistance based on ADB**


2. Protected staircase and lobbies → **30 minutes structural fire resistance**

3. Penetrations and Fire stopping



Detailed Fire Safety Strategy


B4-External Fire Spread



Safe distance to the building based on BR 187

Elevation	Enclosing rectangle dimensions (m)		Sprinklers considered	Radiation intensity (kW/m ²)	Minimum distance to achieve 100% unprotected area (m)
	W	H			
1	27	17.5	No	84	14.4
2	33	17.5	No	84	15.8
3	27	17.5	No	84	14.4
4	33	17.5	No	84	15.8

B5-Access and Facilities for FRS



1. No automatic FRS notification
2. Hardstanding areas will be provided for a high reach appliance to within 18 m of a minimum of 50% of the buildings perimeter (resulting in access to at least 60 m of the perimeter)



Minimum access route specification	Appliance type	
	Pump	High reach
Width between kerbs (m)	3.7	3.7
Width between gateways (m)	3.1	3.1
Turning circle between kerbs (m)	16.8	26.0
Turning circle between walls (m)	19.2	29.0
Clearance height (m)	3.7	4.0
Carrying capacity (tonnes)	12.5	17.0

Detailed Fire Safety Strategy Gloucestershire Airport Overflow Car Park Cheltenham


Part of building	Minimum fire resistance rating when tested to the relevant European standard (minutes)	Methods of exposure
Structural frame, beam or column	R 15	Exposed faces
Loadbearing walls	R 15	Each side separately
Floors	REI 15	From underside
Roofs: Performing the function of a floor	REI 15	From underside
External walls: Any part less than 1,000 mm from a point on the relevant boundary	REI 15	Each side separately
Any part more than 1,000 mm from the relevant boundary	REI 15	From the inside
Any part adjacent to an external escape route	RE 30	From the inside
Enclosure (not forming part of a protected shaft) to a: Protected stairway	REI 30	Each side separately
Lift shaft	REI 30	Each side separately
Enclosure to a protected lobby	REI 30	Each side separately
Note: In the European classification, the resistance to fire is specified in terms of loadbearing capacity 'R', integrity 'E' and insulation 'I'.		

Fire resistance is compliant with ADB, what about previous fire accidents with same design?

Research Method



**Anonymous
Review**




12 UK Fire Services feedback on the Fire strategy


ADB	Key Questions
B1	Is evacuation design satisfactory?
	Are emergency Voice communications (EVCs) efficient?
	Are manual call points (MCP) adequate?
B2 & B3	Is 30 minutes means of escape fire protection adequate?
	Is automatic suppression system required?
	Is 15 minutes structural fire protection?
B4	Are designed safe separation distances satisfactory?
B5	Is water supply system satisfactory?
	Is applicable access to and around the building provided?
EVs	Are there any further consideration required regarding EVs ?

**12 UK Fire
Services
Feedback?**


Is **evacuation** design satisfactory?




1. **Evacuation Lift**
2. **Organized Evacuation of disabled people**
3. **Requirement for ASET/RSET Analysis**




Are **emergency Voice communications (EVCs)** efficient?



Clarifying **communication points** management




Are **manual call points** (MCP) adequate?




Requirement for **automatic detection:**


- **Mobility degree variation**
- **EVs hazards**



Is **30 minutes means of escape** fire protection adequate?



1. **Increased HRR** of modern cars
2. **Fuel running** effect
3. **Prolonged** evacuation and firefighting condition
4. **Fire Breaks** as radiation barriers



Is **automatic suppression** system required?

YES!

NO!

17%

83%

Controlling fire spread between
ICEVs and EVs jet flames



B1

B2

&

B3



Is **15 minutes structural** fire protection?

NO!

YES!

17%

83%

1. “Fire load is **NOT** well-defined”

- Modern cars with **higher calorific value** and **larger in size**

- **Unstaffed** hours

2. **FRS** attendance prolonged duration




B1

B2

&

B3

Are designed **safe separation distances** satisfactory?



Higher distance due to higher HRR



Is **water supply** system satisfactory?

NO!

YES!




25%

75%


1. **Larger hose-run distance**
2. **Number of hydrants**
3. **Higher water flow rate**



Is **applicable access** to and around the building provided?



Are there any further consideration required regarding **EVs**?



1. **No relevant guidance** from ADB
2. **AWSS required** for horizontal jet flames control
3. **EVs placement** within the building?
4. **EVs toxic gas** production while burning
5. **EVCs isolation** via detection/suppression system



B1

B2

&

B3

B4

B5

+ EVs



Conclusion

B1:

- **9 Fire Services** recommended adjustments in **evacuation design** and some aligning with BS EN 81-76 and FSO guidance.
- **7 Fire Services** found **manual call points (MCPs)** inadequate, suggesting automated detection systems for first floor with EVs due to unsupervised hours.

B2 & B3:

- **5 Fire Services** called for increasing **escape route fire resistance from 30 mins** to higher ratings, especially for areas near to EVs due to their higher calorific value and prolonged burning.
- **15 mins structural fire resistance** was deemed insufficient, with **9 Fire Services** urging extensions to address modern vehicles increased fire loads.

B4:

- **4 Fire Services** recommended considering 84 kW/m² radiation intensity due to presence of **EVs with higher calorific value**.

B5:

- **All Fire Services** sought improved **firefighting access**, including shafts, dry risers, and higher water flow rates.


EVs:

- **8 Fire Services** commented on suggestions including: **isolating charging point power supplies, relocating** EVs to upper floors targeting enhanced ventilation, and **increasing spacing between cars** to limit fire spread.

Conclusion

Fire Services Feedbacks

■ YES ■ NO



Acknowledgements

Funding Bodies



Upcoming presentations



About myself



PhD student of Fire safety Engineering (July 2024-present)



Sharif University of Technology

MSc and BEng of Material Science and Engineering

Project title: “Design of car parks against fire: is the current guidance adequate?”

Supervisors: Dr Xu Dai, Dr Martina Manes and Dr Charlie Hopkin

In the next steps...

Numerical and experimental investigations for an open-sided car park case study



ANY QUESTIONS?

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7th April 2025

Supervisors:

Dr Xu Dai (xu.dai@liverpool.ac.uk), Dr Martina Manes and Dr Charlie Hopkin